We test the effects of stake size on ambiguity attitudes. Compared to a baseline condition, we find subjects to be more ambiguity seeking for small-probability gains and large-probability losses under high stakes. They are also more ambiguity averse for large-probability gains and small-probability losses. We trace these effects back to stake effects on decisions under risk (known probabilities) and uncertainty (unknown probabilities). For risk we replicate previous findings. For uncertainty, we find an increase in probabilistic insensitivity under high stakes that is driven by increased uncertainty aversion for large-probability gains and for small-probability losses. At the individual level, we find inter alia that subjects display more pessimism for small-probability losses than optimism for small-probability gains under uncertainty, and that they display more pessimism for large-probability gains than optimism for large-probability losses. These findings, in turn, may have consequences for financial decision making and insurance uptake, which we discuss.
Motivation
Some form of uncertainty is involved in most important decision making processes, and uncertainty about the future may indeed be considered inherent to the human condition. It is thus not surprising that how people react to such uncertainties has received considerable attention in decision theory, starting with the development of expected value theory by Blaise Pascal and Pierre Fermat in the mid 1600s and arriving at the formulation of Cumulative Prospect Theory in the 1990s (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) . Most empirical investigations have, however, concentrated on the special case of risk, where objective probabilities are known (Abdellaoui, Vossmann, & Weber, 2005; van de Kuilen & Wakker, 2011) . This case is a good representation of some decision situations, such as national lotteries, for which probabilities can be calculated, or many medical decision problems, for which precise probabilities can be derived from a large number of past observations. Nevertheless, the case of uncertainty proper, for which no precise or objectively derivable probabilities are available, is likely to be much more important in praxis. Already Knight (1921) observed how profits are the reward entrepreneurs reap for dealing with precisely such situations of unknown probabilities. The same type of uncertainty also prevails in many other decision situations, as varied as buying a house, investing in the stock market, or deciding on one's education.
Notwithstanding its importance in the real world, such uncertainty has until recently mostly been studied only in opposition to behavior under risk, and even so mostly for a restricted class of 50-50 gambles over gains. The phenomenon by which people tend to prefer outcome generating processes characterized by known probabilities (risk) over outcome generating processes with vague or unknown probabilities (uncertainty) which are normatively equivalent under subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954) is known as ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 1961) . In addition to the challenges it creates for traditional decision theory, it has been deemed to be an important determinant of a variety of real world decisions, including the home bias (Kilka & Weber, 2000) , reluctance to vaccinate (Ritov & Baron, 1990) , and the preference for established brands over new ones (Muthukrishnan, Wathieu, & Xu, 2009) , to name but a few.
Only recently has there been developed a more systematic approach to measuring ambiguity attitudes over the whole probability spectrum and for less artificial types of uncertainty (Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, & Wakker, 2011; Abdellaoui et al., 2005; Fox & Tversky, 1998; Kilka & Weber, 2001; Maafi, 2011; van de Kuilen & Wakker, 2011) . Given, however, the recency of these developments, many issues remain to be explored. This paper specifically investigates whether ambiguity attitudes are affected by the magnitude of the monetary outcomes at stake, a problem on which no evidence exists to date. Ambiguity attitudes are thereby estimated for different stake levels over the whole probability space. This focus on ambiguity attitudes, i.e. on the contrast between behavior under risk and uncertainty rather than on behavior under uncertainty per se, is in keeping with the tradition in the decision making literature. In addition, however, we can trace any stake effects we find for ambiguity back to its constituent parts-stake effects for risk and stake effect for uncertainty -and thus determine what underlying patterns drive stake effects for ambiguity. Also, contrary to most of the literature on stake effects under risk, we use a between subjects design which avoids potential contrast effects resulting from the direct contraposition of high and low stake decisions (Greenwald, 1978; Lefebvre, Vieider, & Villeval, 2010; Read, 2005) .
The issue of stake effects on ambiguity and uncertainty attitudes is important to the extent that real world decisions involving more or less well-known probabilities may concern a diverse spectrum of outcomes, ranging from relatively trivial stakes to extremely high ones. Any differences in ambiguity attitudes dependent on stakes can thus be informative about this type of behavior. Furthermore, possible stake effects under uncertainty provide information on the extent to which results obtained with low stakes in the laboratory can be generalized to decisions with nontrivial stakes in the field, or on how any such generalizations might need to be adjusted for differences in stakes. Since we elicit certainty equivalents (CEs) for a number of prospects with different probabilities, we can analyze how such a stake effect manifests itself over the whole probability space, not just for the classical case of 50-50 probabilities. Furthermore, we present evidence for both gains and losses. This may be interesting for analyzing decisions e.g. on the stock market, which can be characterized as decisions under true uncertainty, and which have been linked to ambiguity aversion (e.g., the stock market participation bias-see discussion).
No evidence on the effect of different stake sizes exists to date for the case of uncertainty, and uncertainty attitudes are in general poorly understood for losses. As a consequence, we also have a very poor understanding of ambiguity attitudes with regard to these same aspects.The case of uncertainty and ambiguity attitudes for losses does hold interest beyond the mere issue of stake effects per se, since little evidence exists to date on attitudes towards uncertainty and ambiguity for losses in general. This seems all the more regrettable since such attitudes are likely to be relevant for a large class of decision problems, including for instance insurance as well as stock market decisions. Given that we can compare decisions under uncertainty to decision under risk, we contribute some evidence to the debate on how insurance decisions under uncertainty may differ from the case in which probabilities are better known. By also observing how such decisions vary with stakes, we furthermore add to our understanding of how stake sizes influence such decision (see Laury et al., 2009 , for a careful experimental investigation under risk involving constant expected values).
The effect of different stake sizes has, on the other hand, been studied extensively for the case of risk, especially for gains. In an experiment conducted in rural India, Binswanger (1980) showed that risk aversion increases in stake levels. Kachelmeier & Shehata (1992) ran high stakes experiments in China, finding that risk seeking for small probabilities was reduced relative to smaller stakes, a results that was replicated by Lefebvre et al. (2010) in France using a between subjects design. Holt & Laury (2002) supplied further evidence on how subjects become more risk averse as stakes increase, and Fehr-Duda, Bruhin, Epper, & Schubert (2010) showed with Chinese subjects how in a prospect theory framework such stake effects will affect the probability weighting function as well as the utility function, thus violating the separability precept by which attitudes towards money are supposed to be reflected purely in utility (see also Hogarth & Einhorn, 1990) .
Stake effects are less well understood for risky losses. Hogarth & Einhorn (1990) found no effect of such stake variations on losses. Etchart-Vincent (2004) tested different hypothetical stake levels against each other, and found only slight evidence for increased risk aversion under high stakes. Bosch-Domènech & Silvestre (2006) , on the other hand, found large increases in risk aversion for both small and large probabilities of losses. Fehr-Duda et al. (2010) found contradictory effects in the loss domain. Moreover, there exist several papers investigating the issue of whether hypothetical choice differs from choices for real money under losses (Etchart-Vincent & L'Haridon, 2011; Laury, McInnes, & Swarthout, 2009; Schoemaker, 1990; Vieider, 2011) , which is however quite a different issue. We provide some additional evidence on the effect of stake sizes for decisions under risk in the loss domain.
We conducted an experiment in Ethiopia where we compare a baseline condition to a high stake condition in which all monetary amounts are doubled in a clean between subjects design. Our findings are as follows. For gains, high stakes cause increases in ambiguity seeking for small probabilities and increases in ambiguity aversion for large probabilities relative to the baseline. This means that under high stakes we observe more extreme jumps at the endpoints of the probability scale, resulting in reduced sensitivity to probabilistic change in the intermediate ranges. We next trace this effect back to stake effects for risk and uncertainty. For known probabilities, we replicate the well-known finding of risk aversion increasing in stake size-an effect that is uniform over the probability space. For unknown probabilities, we find uncertainty aversion to increase in stake sizes just as for risk. This effect, however, happens entirely through increased uncertainty aversion for large probabilities with uncertainty attitudes for small probabilities remaining unchanged, thus resulting in reduced probabilistic sensitivity for intermediate probabilities. The effect found under ambiguity is thus driven mainly by stake effects in decisions under uncertainty. This pattern is mirrored for losses. In the baseline condition we find a pattern of ambiguity aversion for low probability levels and ambiguity seeking for large probability levels. Under high stakes, we again find an accentuation of these patterns at the endpoints of the probability scales, with subjects being more ambiguity averse for small probabilities and more ambiguity seeking for large probabilities.
Once again, this pattern is driven by more extreme uncertainty attitudes at the endpoints of the probability scale, while we find no effect of stakes on risk attitudes.
Experiment: Setup and Method
Subjects. A total of 157 subjects were recruited by the authors at Addis Ababa University, in Ethiopia, on the campus of Economics, Management and Information Sciences. The experiment was conducted in English-the teaching language of the university-and one of the authors, who conducted the experiments and is fluent in Amharic (the local language), provided additional explanations where needed. A total of 12 subjects had to be excluded because they manifestly did not understand the task or did not respond to all questions. The average age was 21.1 years, and 73% of subjects were male.
Task. We elicited certainty equivalents (CEs) for simple binary prospects through choice lists-the standard for eliciting risk preferences today (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; . This procedure involved making subjects choose between a prospect and different sure amounts of money increasing in steps of 3 Birr from the low amount in the prospect to the high amount of the prospect, with the amounts being mirrored for losses, which took place from an endowment. Two examples of such a choice list can be found in the appendix, one for gains and one for losses; the appendix also provides a complete list of the prospects used. It should be noted that subjects were told that there were no right or wrong answers and that we were only interested in their preferences. They were also told, however, that we were interested in the point where they would switch from preferring the prospect to preferring the sure amount (the opposite for losses), and that they should not switch back and forth between prospect and sure amount. For unknown probabilities, the elicitation of CEs has the advantage of producing a measure of the strength of preferences, while avoiding biases that result from the elicitation of willingness to pay or willingness to accept measures (Trautmann, Vieider, & Wakker, 2011) . The CEs were elicited using paper and pencil and keeping the order of the tasks constant throughout the experiment. Risky gains were followed by uncertain gains. Once this first part of the experiment was over, subjects received a second set of instructions concerning the loss part. Again, CEs for risky losses were elicited first and then CEs for uncertain losses were elicited. While such a fixed ordering of tasks may induce order effects, we felt that such effects were preferable to the increased noise levels that were likely to result from a randomization of the order in which the decision tasks were presented. Losses took place from an endowment. Etchart-Vincent & l'Haridon (2011) tested whether such losses from endowment would result in different effects from actual losses and found no such differences. They also found no order effect for losses being administered before or after gains. Risky prospects were represented using eight consecutively numbered balls in an urn. Uncertain prospects, implemented through Ellsberg-type urns, were also represented through eight numbered balls, and subjects were told that while there were always eight balls in the vague-probability urn just as in the risky one, it was possible that some numbers may be absent while others would occur repeatedly (the names risky and uncertain were not used in the experiment, the urns were called transparent and opaque instead; see appendix B for the instructions and an example of the representation). This procedure follows closely the one used by Abdellaoui et al. (2011) , except that we used numbers instead of colors to be able to print instructions in black and white.
Treatments and payoffs. 83 subjects participated in the baseline condition and 62 in the high stakes condition in a between subjects design. The gender ratio did not significantly differ between treatments (z=0.336, p=0.73). While within subject designs have often been employed for stake comparisons in the literature, we chose this alternative to avoid contrast effects that can potentially results in experimenter demand effects in within subject designs (Greenwald, 1978; Read, 2005) .
Running the experiment in Ethiopia allowed us to offer non-trivial payoffs to the subjects. The monetary prize to be won in the baseline condition was 120 Birr. This is the PPP equivalent of €20
and it corresponds to about 20-25% of the total monthly expenditure of the median participant in the experiment. In the high stakes condition, all monetary amounts were doubled. While this may be considered a relatively modest increase in stake sizes compared to other manipulations in the literature, this also means that any effects found are all the more notable. At the end of the experiment, one of the decisions was randomly selected for real pay. This is the standard procedure in this kinds of experiment (Baltussen, Post, van den Assem, & Wakker, 2012) .
Estimation and analysis. Stake effects can be difficult to analyze within a certain decision model. For instance, Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992 )-the prevalent descriptive theory of decision making under risk and uncertainty today (Starmer, 2000;  Wakker, 2010)-represents decisions through utility and probability weighting functions, which both contribute to risk attitudes. This, however, means that any effects of stakes on risk attitudes may affect both utility and probability weighting and in some cases produce opposite effects on the two, such that the final effect on risk attitudes may be unclear (Vieider, 2012) . It is thus convenient to employ some indices that summarize the information over the probability space, so as to systematically organize the information derived from several certainty equivalents, without recurring to any particular theory to organize the results. To this end, we estimate the best linear fit for the CEs by maximum likelihood estimation 1 at the individual level:
, where X is the highest outcome or prize to be won in the prospect (a list of the prospects used for estimation can be found in appendix A). This regression line is estimated separately for gains and losses, and a number of indices are derived from it. The indices are illustrated in figure 1 . A positive intercept, c, indicates a certainty equivalent for small probabilities that is larger than the expected value (EV) of the prospect in absolute terms (indicating risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for losses), and a slope, s, smaller than 1 indicates that CEs increase less than linearly in the EV of the prospect and is thus an index of the sensitivity of CEs to changes in probability. In addition to the intercept and the slope, we use two more indices to make the exposition more intuitive (see Abdellaoui, L'Haridon, & Zank, 2010 , for a discussion). One is the anti-intercept, that is the distance of the regression line from 1 at p=1, which is given by 1-s-c, and a positive value of which indicates risk aversion for gains or risk seeking for losses. Finally, we can construct a global measure of average attitudes over the probability space by subtracting the intercept from the antiintercept, 1-s-2c (Abdellaoui et al., 2011) . This index takes the value of zero under risk neutrality, is positive if there is a tendency towards risk aversion (risk seeking for losses) and negative if the general tendency goes towards risk seeking (risk aversion for losses) . While risk attitudes are fully characterized by any two of these four measures, it may sometimes be convenient to present results for all four of them. Notice how these indices are formally equivalent to the indices employed by Abdellaoui et al. ( 2011 Abdellaoui et al. ( , 2010 to analyze neo-additive weighting functions (Chateauneuf, Eichberger, & Grant, 2007) . Viscusi & Evans (2006) found such linear functions to be good representations of preferences. Notice also, however, that in our case these indices do not represent attributes of a probability weighting function, but rather a linear best fit for our non-parametric data 2 . We can construct the same indices for risk, uncertainty, and for ambiguity attitudes, whereby the latter are given by the index under risk minus the equivalent index under uncertainty (and vice versa for losses).
Noise and violations of stochastic dominance. Overall, noise levels in the data were rather high.
Such high noise levels are not unusual for poor developing countries-see Vieider, Chmura, & Martinsson (2012a) for comparisons and a discussion. Some subjects systematically violated firstorder stochastic dominance, which resulted in a negative slope of the regression line described above. Violations of stochastic dominance are common even amongst highly educated subjects in the West (Birnbaum, 1999) . Since such preferences violate basic principles of rationality, we excluded subjects who had a negative slope for any of the four decision domains involved-risky gains, uncertain gains, risky losses, or uncertain losses. This brought us to eliminate 13 subjects in the high stakes condition and 19 subjects in the baseline condition. The results reported below do not change qualitatively if these subjects are included in the analysis. Hypotheses. We hypothesize that risk aversion will increase in stake size for all probability levels for gains. For losses we hypothesize that stakes will have no effect on risk attitudes. Since there is no evidence so far on stake size effects on decisions under uncertainty, our hypotheses are by necessity more tentative. We anticipate the same qualitative effects as for risk, although quantitatively the effects may be weaker given lower levels of sensitivity under uncertainty. Finally, we attempt no direct hypotheses about effects on ambiguity attitudes, since the latter depend on the quantitative differences between the effects on risk and on uncertainty, for which we have no clear predictions.
Aggregate Results

Ambiguity attitudes for gains
We start by looking at stake effects on ambiguity attitudes, represented in figure 2, with the probability of winning represented on the x-axis and ambiguity aversion represented on the y-axis.
Ambiguity attitudes are then represented by the area between each of two lines and the x-axis (which can be seen as representing normalized risk attitudes, since ambiguity attitudes are defined as the difference between risk and uncertainty attitudes), with areas above the x-axis representing ambiguity aversion and areas below the x-axis representing ambiguity seeking. In the baseline condition, we observe ambiguity aversion over the whole probability space, although we cannot exclude the null hypothesis of an intercept equal to zero (z=1.18, p=0.24), indicating equal attitudes towards risk and ambiguity for small probabilities. There is, however, clear ambiguity aversion for large probabilities, with an anti-intercept significantly larger than zero (z=4.37, p<0.001). There is also clear ambiguity aversion at the global level, as indicated by a significantly positive index of global attitudes (z=5.18, p<0.001). While for small probabilities we find subjects to be marginally more ambiguity seeking under high stakes relative to the baseline (z=1.73, p=0.083), subjects are considerably more ambiguity averse for large probabilities under high stakes compared to the baseline (z=3.09, p=0.002). While the opposing trends at the two endpoints cancel out at the global level, so that there is no difference in terms of global or average ambiguity attitudes (z=1.03, p=0.31), there is a considerable change in the slope indicating a movement towards more extreme attitudes at the two endpoints of the probability spectrum (z=3.03, p=0.002) 3 . To understand what is driving the above results, we must look at the effect of the stake variation on risk attitudes and on uncertainty attitudes in isolation. Figure 3 shows stake effects for decisions involving known probabilities (i.e. risk) for gains. The first thing that is apparent from the figure is that there is a considerable amount of risk seeking in the baseline condition. Indeed, we find risk seeking to be the dominant pattern in the baseline condition (z=3.14, p=0.002). High levels of risk seeking are actually less rare than supposed so far-for a discussion and a worldwide comparison of risk attitudes, see Vieider, Chmura, & Martinsson (2012a) 4 . As to the effect of increased stakes, it is clearly apparent that the regression line shifts downward in a parallel fashion as stakes increase.
There is less risk seeking for small probabilities under larger stakes (z=2.78, p=0.006), more risk aversion for large probabilities (z=1.80, p=0.073), and hence also more risk aversion on a global level (z=3.37, p=0.001). And indeed, the global trend now goes in the direction of risk aversion (z=1.95, p=0.051). The slope of the line, indicating insensitivity to probabilistic change, is not affected by stake size (z=0.13, p=0.89). These results thus correspond well to previous findings in 4 High levels of risk seeking have also been found before in Ethiopia (Doerr, Toman, & Schmidt, 2011) , as well as other East African countries (Henrich & McElreath, 2002) . On the other hand, Akay, Martinsson, Medhin, & Trautmann (2011) found risk aversion to prevail for farmers in northern Ethiopia.
the literature. Figure 4 shows the equivalent regression lines for the case of unknown probabilities for gains. In the baseline condition, we find that for small (vague) probabilities our subjects are uncertainty seeking, declaring a certainty equivalent that is higher than the expected value of the prospect (z=6.58, p<0.001). For large probabilities, we observe uncertainty aversion (z=5.54, p<0.001). The slope of the regression line is considerably smaller than one (z=6.12, p<0.001), indicating probabilistic insensitivity. This pattern generally corresponds quite well to patterns previously observed (Abdellaoui et al., 2011; Maafi, 2011) , except that, consistently with what we found under risk, there is no prevalence of global uncertainty aversion (z=1.52, p=0.13).
Qualitatively, the pattern we observe under high stakes is similar, with uncertainty seeking for small probabilities (z=4.64, p<0.001), uncertainty aversion for large probabilities (z=5.90, p<0.001), and probabilistic insensitivity (z=6.01, p<0.001). We observe, however, a clear shift downwards as stakes increase. While there is no difference between stake conditions for small probabilities (z=1.10, p=0.27), the difference is highly significant for large probabilities (z=3.79, p<0.001). Once again, this results in a clear difference at the global level (z=3.98, p<0.001), where uncertainty aversion is now the prevalent pattern (z=5.45, p<0.001). The combination of these elements, in turn, also determines a change of the slope of the line, going in the direction of an increase in insensitivity as stakes increase (z=2.70, p=0.007). In conclusion we can thus say that the effect of more extreme ambiguity attitudes at the endpoints of the probability scale is mostly driven by stake effect on uncertainty attitudes. For risk, we replicate previous findings with subjects becoming more risk averse uniformly over the probability spectrum as stakes increase. Under uncertainty-for which no previous findings on stake effects exist-we find an increase in uncertainty aversion. While attitudes for low probabilities remain unaffected, however, this effect is driven entirely by considerably more uncertainty aversion for large probabilities, ultimately resulting in the rotation of the ambiguity line.
Ambiguity attitudes for losses
We next investigate ambiguity attitudes for losses-the results are depicted in figure 5 . The first thing that is apparent is that, while ambiguity attitudes in the baseline condition follow a pattern of ambiguity aversion for small probabilities followed by a slight tendency towards ambiguity seeking for moderate to large probabilities, these tendencies are again amplified under high stakes. This is indeed confirmed by the statistical analysis, with high stakes resulting in increased ambiguity aversion for small probabilities (z=2.76, p=0.006), as well as increased ambiguity seeking for large probabilities (z=2.20, p=0.028) compared to the baseline condition. While these two contrasting effects cancel out at the global level, so that on average there is no difference (z=1.16, p=0.25), there is once again a clear difference in slopes (z=2.69, p=0.007), indicating more extreme reactions at the endpoints of the probability scale under high stakes, similar to the ones already observed for gains. Once again, we can trace this effect to its constituent parts under risk and uncertainty. Figure 6 shows the effect of stake variations on risk attitudes for losses. The general pattern is one of risk aversion for small probabilities (z=4.11, p<0.001) and risk seeking for large probabilities (z=6.43, p<0.001), as well as probabilistic insensitivity (z=6.36, p<0.001). This pattern thus corresponds to what has typically been found in the literature (Abdellaoui, 2000; Etchart-Vincent, 2009 ). It is furthermore clear that there is no difference between the conditions, either for small probabilities (z=0.87, p=0.39), large probabilities (z=0.=1.11, p=0.27), or globally (z=0.09 p=0.92). It follows that there is also no difference in slopes (z=0.76, p=0.44). This confirms our hypothesis that risk attitudes for losses will not be affected by stake size. Figure 7 shows the linear regression lines for uncertain losses under the different stakes. The pattern in the baseline condition is again one of uncertainty aversion for small probabilities (z=4.11, p<0.001) and uncertainty seeking for large probabilities (z=4.62, p<0.001). While there is again significant probabilistic insensitivity (z=4.74, p<0.001), globally there is no prevailing trend, with the uncertainty aversion for small probabilities and uncertainty seeking for large probabilities balancing each other out (z=0.03, p=0.98). Furthermore, there is now a clear stake effect for small probabilities, with increased aversion to uncertainty resulting from higher stakes (z=2.54, p=0.011).
While there is no significant effect for large probabilities (z=1.00, p=0.32) or in global terms (z=0.88, p=0.38), probabilistic insensitivity increases even further under high stakes as compared to the baseline (z=2.24, p=0.025). We thus find very similar effects to those already observed in the gain domain. Ambiguity attitudes become more extreme at the endpoints. This effect is driven again mainly by a rotation of the regression line when high stakes are offered under uncertainty. And again high stakes increase uncertainty aversion, while they do not affect uncertainty seeking in the relevant parts of the probability spectrum.
Individual level analysis and gain-loss reflection
So far we have analyzed only aggregate patterns of decisions under risk and uncertainty, and their differences. It may however be interesting to look into some patterns at the individual level. Some issues that have not been addressed yet are the relative strength of risk and uncertainty attitudes for gains and losses, as well as the correlation between risk and uncertainty attitudes within the gain and the loss domain. Tables 1 and 2 show correlations between global risk and uncertainty attitudes both within domain and across domains.
Let us start by looking at the gain and loss domains in isolation as we have done in the aggregate analysis above. The correlations we are interested in can be found in the top left block and in the lower right block in tables 1 and 2. In terms of global attitudes reported in table 1, we find risk and uncertainty attitudes to be significantly correlated within both the gain and the loss domain, regardless of stake levels. For sensitivity, displayed in table 2, the story is somewhat different. While we find again highly significant correlations between risk and uncertainty in the gain domain for all stake levels, in the loss domain we now find the sensitivities to changes in known versus vague probabilities to be significantly correlated only for high stakes; there are only very weak correlations in the baseline condition. Another interesting issue is whether risk and uncertainty attitudes are correlated across gain and loss domains. The presumed equality of such indices has been referred to as the reflection effect for decision making under risk (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) , since it will result in risk seeking for large probability losses and risk aversion for large probability gains. While it has generally been found to hold at the aggregate level, there is some evidence that it is generally violated at the individual level for risky decisions (Baucells & Villasís, 2010; Cohen, Jaffray, & Said, 1987; Schoemaker, 1990) . We can now add to this literature by looking not only at decisions under risk but also at decisions under uncertainty, and by examining these issues for different stake levels.
Baseline
Starting by looking at the global risk and uncertainty attitudes reported in table 1, we find hardly any significant correlations between domains in the baseline condition. Under high stakes, however, risk attitudes under losses are found to correlate with risk attitudes under gains. This correlation is negative, indicating that higher levels of risk aversion in the gain domain tend to be associated to higher degrees of risk aversion in the loss domain. A similar correlation is found between uncertainty attitudes in the gain domain and risk attitudes in the loss domain. The correlation between uncertainty attitudes in the gain domain and uncertainty attitudes in the loss domain is much weaker, and only marginally significant; and there is no correlation between risk attitudes in the gain domain and uncertainty attitudes in the loss domain. For sensitivity, however, the findings are somewhat inverted, with correlations mostly occurring in the baseline condition, where the sensitivity towards both known and vague probabilities under losses is positively correlated to the sensitivity towards vague probabilities under gains.
The mere correlations presented above do obviously not tell us whether there is indeed a reflection effect or not, since the latter is usually measured relative to the benchmark of risk neutrality. In this respect, it is difficult to speak of a reflection effect in the baseline condition at all, since the median pattern for gains is, as we have already seen, one of risk seeking, thus already running counter to such an effect. Vieider, Chmura, & Martinsson (2012b) analyze the reflection effect in a number of different countries and conclude that the pattern is not only violated at the individual level, but often also in the aggregate. Nevertheless, We see immediately that the reflection pattern of risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses is now the most infrequent pattern at 13%. This is not surprising, given that risk aversion is not a prevalent pattern for gains even at the aggregate level. For losses, however, risk seeking is indeed the dominant decision pattern at the aggregate level. Under vague probabilities, on the other hand, we find that the pattern of uncertainty aversion for gains and uncertainty seeking for losses is very prominent at the aggregate level (although tying with uncertainty aversion in the case of losses).
The reflection pattern is now also the modal pattern individually, although by a relatively narrow margin. Table 4 reproduces prevailing global risk and uncertainty attitudes in the different domains for the high stake condition. For risk, we again find no identifiable reflection effect at the individual level. While risk aversion is now indeed the majority pattern for gains and risk seeking is the most frequent pattern observed for losses in the aggregate, at the individual level risk seeking for both gains and losses is the modal finding-even though this is only slightly more frequent than risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses (the reflection pattern) and risk aversion for both gains and losses. Under uncertainty, on the other hand, we do indeed find a majority of subjects to be uncertainty averse for gains and uncertainty seeking for losses. The second most frequent pattern is one of uncertainty aversion for both gains and losses. What we have seen so far tells us little about the relative strength of the different uncertainty attitudes in the gain and loss domain. A particularly interesting issue that may warrant an extra look is how small probability events are dealt with for gains relative to losses under uncertainty. Indeed, if unlikely negative events are overweighted more than unlikely positive events under uncertainty, then people may shy away from symmetrically distributed investment opportunities even if the latter have positive expected value-a finding that may contribute to the explanation of some paradoxes, such as the stock market participation puzzle, whereby people tend to underinvest in stocks, and the equity premium puzzle, whereby people tend to prefer bonds over stocks at a rate that is hard to explain by typical amounts of risk aversion 5 . In the baseline condition, the median values for the intercept are 0.14 for gains as well as for losses, so that equality of the intercept for gains and losses cannot be excluded (z=0.10, p=0.92). For high stakes, however, the corresponding value is 0.14 for gains and 0.24 for losses, so that we observe much more uncertainty aversion for small probability losses than uncertainty seeking for small probability gains (z=4.03, p<0.001).
Losses
For reasons of symmetry, we also analyze the same issue of the relative strength of weighting for gains and losses for large probabilities under uncertainty. In the baseline condition the two anti-intercepts are again very similar, coming in at 0.20 for gains and 0.17 for losses (z=1.57, p=0.12). This again changes for high stakes, where we now have modest optimism for losses (0.18) but large pessimism for gains (0.47), which results in a significant difference (z=3.56, p<0.001).
Notice how these two findings taken together could make people shy away from high stakes positive expected value investments giving a high probability of gains and low probability of a loss, since the prevailing pattern is one of strong pessimism for large probability gains as well as for small probability losses under uncertainty.
Discussion
We investigated the effect of stake variations on ambiguity attitudes over the probability spectrum, for both gains and losses. We then traced these effects back to stake effects separately for risk and uncertainty to determine what may be driving the effects we find in terms of ambiguity attitudes.
For risk we broadly confirm previous findings in the literature. In particular, we find risk taking to be reduced/risk aversion to be increased for gains in a clean between subjects design which excludes possible contrast effects (Greenwald, 1978; Lefebvre et al., 2010; Read, 2005) . We furthermore show that this reduction in risk seeking is uniform over the probability space, contrary to hypotheses formulated in the past (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1990) . For risky losses, we find no evidence of stake effects. This goes towards further clarifying previous findings, with e.g. (Schoemaker, 1990 ) finding no effect of stakes on risk attitudes for losses, while Fehr-Duda et al.
(2010) found contradictory effects of stakes and Bosch-Domènech & Silvestre (2006) found rather strong effects. Vieider (2012) found some effects of stake size on probability weighting functions for losses, which were however counteracted by opposite effects on utility, with the overall effect thus tending towards no difference.
More originally, we provide the first evidence on stake effects for decisions under uncertainty, where the probabilities associated to the different outcomes are unknown or vague.
Contrary to our initial tentative hypothesis, effects under uncertainty do not per se tend to be weaker than under risk. Instead, there is a qualitative difference in stake effects that emerges between risk and uncertainty. While the regression lines stay parallel for risk under both gains and losses, indicating an effect that is equally strong over the whole probability space, for uncertainty we observe a pivoting in the regression line, indicating decreased probabilistic sensitivity as stakes increase-or equivalently, more pronounced reactions at the extremes of the probability distribution. For gains, there is also a significant downward shift over the whole probability space, indicating increased aversion to uncertainty under high stakes overall, which mimics the effect obtained under risk. For losses, there is no global effect, just as under risk. There is however the same pivoting effect as observed for gains.
Given the null or parallel effects under risk, the pivoting of the lines under uncertainty indicates differences in ambiguity attitudes over the probability spectrum. We find high stakes to induce increased ambiguity seeking for small probabilities of gains and for moderate to large probabilities of losses, and increased ambiguity aversion for small to moderate probability losses and moderate to high probability gains. This effect can be traced back mostly to the effect of stakes on decisions under uncertainty-an issue on which no previous evidence existed. Under uncertainty, people seem to display an even more pronounced possibility effect, induced by a movement from a zero probability to a small positive probability, as well as a more pronounced certainty effect, induced by moving from a large probability to absolute certainty (Tversky & Wakker, 1995) . The insensitivity to probability changes in the intermediate ranges thus increases as stakes increase.
One issue that needs to be addressed explicitly is the extent to which the effects we have found may generalize to other countries, considering that in absolute terms our Ethiopian subjects were considerably more risk seeking than generally found in western countries. A reassuring indication in this direction derives from the fact that for risk we were able to replicate previous findings on stake effects. Indeed, the stake effects on risk we found correspond closely to effects obtained in China Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992) , India (Binswanger, 1980) , the US (Holt & Laury, 2002) , and France (Lefebvre et al., 2010) . Given that absolute risk attitudes between some of those countries have been found to differ Hsee & Weber, 1998; Vieider, Chmura, & Martinsson, 2012a) , while stake effects on risk attitudes were (qualitatively) the same, we feel thus confident that our results on stake effects will generalize to different countries.
This opens the floor for the discussion of some potential real world consequences. Our findings may indeed be important for obtaining a better understanding of many real world processes -especially to the extent that uncertainty is more realistic and common than risk. Compared for instance to studies that have investigated insurance issues with known probability risks, our results
show that insurance uptake is likely to be higher than the one found under risk, given ambiguity aversion for small probability losses. This is even more true for large negative consequences, for which we have seen uncertainty aversion for losses to increase, while risk aversion remained unaffected. While it is true that some studies have found a higher propensity to buying insurance for larger probability, lower consequence events (Kunreuther & Pauly, 2004; Kunreuther, Novemsky, & Kahneman, 2001; Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Corrigan, & Combs, 1977) , such studies did not generally control for all possible confounds, such as for instance the expected value of the loss (in laboratory studies) or the subjective probability of the loss (for real world evidence; see Laury et al., 2009 , for a detailed discussion).
Ambiguity aversion has also been indicated as a possible cause of financial biases such as the stock market participation puzzle (Cao, Wang, & Zhang, 2005; Easly & O'Hara, 2009) .
Recently, Dimmock, Kouwenberg, & Wakker (2012) found that stock market participation, as well as the ownership of small businesses, is negatively correlated with ambiguity-induced insensitivity.
To the extent that such slopes become more extreme as stakes increase, this may indeed by an important factor for the explanation of such decisions, given the overestimation of small probabilities of losses and underestimation of moderate to large probabilities of gains that derive from it. The latter point is further reinforced by the fact that for large stakes we find uncertainty aversion for small probability losses to be stronger than uncertainty loving for gains of equal probability. Given a symmetric distribution of stock returns about a positive mean, this may by itself imply that people shy away from such investments. A similar account may hold for the equity premium puzzle. While experimental investigations of the latter have taken place entirely under risk and have successfully explained the paradox through myopic loss aversion (Fellner & Sutter, 2009; Gneezy & Potters, 1997) , differential weighting of small probability losses and gains under uncertainty may well contribute to the phenomenon in the real world.
Finally, many economic applications of Prospect Theory require the reflection of risk attitudes, sometimes at the individual level, to explain for instance the contemporary uptake of insurance and playing of lotteries, or reversals of preference between gain and loss frames (Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenberg, & Perner, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) . Such documented behavior has long been at odds with the experimental evidence showing that such a reflection effect is a minority pattern at least at the individual level. Our results, however, show that the reflection effect becomes more prominent as stakes increase-even though within the limit of our experimental manipulation it still falls short of reaching a majority for risk. Furthermore, this pattern is much more pronounced under uncertainty than risk, representing indeed the behavior of a majority under high stakes-an issue on which no previous evidence existed. This, in turn, somewhat reconciles previous experimental results with real world evidence that has been explained by the reflection effect (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988) , and for which uncertainty may be a better fit than the somewhat artificial case of pure risk.
Conclusion
The main objective of this paper was to test the effect of stake size on ambiguity attitudes. We found that under high stakes ambiguity attitudes become more extreme, with increased ambiguity seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses relative to the baseline condition.
Moreover, we also found increased ambiguity aversion for large probability gains and small probability losses. We then traced these effects back to stake effects under risk and uncertainty. For risk, we replicated the classic result of increased risk aversion for gains under large stakes. We also brought additional evidence indicating that such risk aversion increases uniformly over the probability space, and that for losses stakes have no effect on decisions. For uncertainty, we found high stakes to increase global uncertainty aversion for gains and not to affect global uncertainty aversion for losses. For both uncertain gains and losses, however, we found incentives to affect the relative incidence of uncertainty aversion towards the endpoints of the probability scale. In particular, subjects were found to be more uncertainty averse for large probability gains and small probability losses under high stakes. Taken together, these findings may help explaining behavior in situations involving small probability large outcome losses, such as insurance decisions and stock market participation.
Appendix B: Instructions and Examples of Decision Tasks
Choice tasks
In the present experiment, you will be asked to choose repeatedly between a fixed amount of money and a lottery. The lottery will always give you a chance to win one of two amounts of money. Figure 1 shows a typical choice task. You are asked repeatedly to choose between playing the lottery and obtaining a sure amount of money. For each row, you are asked to indicate whether you would prefer to play the lottery or to obtain the sure amount of money by ticking the preferred option.
The urn indicated in the figure contains eight numbered balls. One ball will be extracted from the urn to determine your payoffs in case you should play the lottery. In the lottery displayed, if ball 1 , 2 , 3, or 4 is extracted, you obtain 60 Birr; if ball 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 is extracted, you obtain nothing. Please pay close attention to the amounts to be won as well as the number of balls associated with each outcome, since they change across decisions. We are interested in the amount for which you will switch from preferring the lottery to preferring the sure amount. Most likely, you will begin by choosing the lottery for small sure amounts, and at a certain point switch to the sure amount as the latter increases. If you do not want the lottery at all, you can choose to get the sure amount in the first row and then continue with the sure amount for all choices (logic: if you prefer 3 Birr over the lottery you should also prefer 6 Birr over the lottery, etc.). Where you will switch from the lottery to the sure amount depends entirely on your preferences-there are no right or wrong answers. However, you should NOT switch back and forth several times between lottery and sure amount! You will be excluded from the experiment if you do so or if it is not possible to clearly recognize your preference (for example, if you have not ticked any box for a given row or ticked both boxes for a given row).
Fig. 1: Example of a typical decision task
Types of choices
You will be asked to take 22 decisions, for each one of which you will need to decide between a lottery and a series of sure amounts as exemplified in figure 1 number of balls associated with each outcome! Indeed, both the higher and lower amount, as well as the number of balls, change between decision problems. Since your final payoff depends on these decisions, it is crucial for you to pay close attention to these features.
There are two different types of lotteries involved. Figure 2 below shows the two different types of lotteries that you will encounter. Fig 2a shows the urn already familiar from figure 1 above. It contains exactly eight (8) balls, numbered from 1 to 8.
In Urn in Fig. 2b also contains exactly eight (8) balls. However, you cannot see what numbers the balls contained in the urn have. This means that you do not know the exact numbers that are present in that urn. All balls bear a number between 1 and 8 inclusive (have either 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , or 8 written on them), but it is possible that some numbers are absent from this urn while others occur repeatedly. Thus you do not know the exact composition of the urn. Fig. 2a: transparent urn  Fig. 2b: opaque urn 
Payoff determination
After you have taken all the decisions, one of your decisions will be randomly drawn for real pay, i.e. the amounts indicated in the decision problem will be paid out for real. First, either part I or part II will be selected for real play by a coin flip. If part I is selected, then one of the decision tasks is drawn at random, using a chance device with equal probability for each decision task to be extracted. For the extracted decision task, one of your decisions, corresponding to one row for which you had to indicate your preference between the sure amount and the lottery, will then be drawn at random with equal probability for each row. If for the row that is drawn you have indicated that you prefer the sure amount of money, you will simply be paid that amount.
In case you have chosen the lottery for the randomly determined row, then that lottery will be played according to the probabilities indicated. For the transparent urn, this will involve drawing a ball from an urn in which all numbers from 1 to 8 inclusive are present. If you should desire to do so, you can verify that there are indeed all balls from 1 to 8 in the urn. You will then be paid the outcome corresponding to the ball you drew.
For the opaque urn, the procedure is exactly analogous, except that you will now draw a ball from a pre-composed urn, the exact composition of which you do not know. You will also be paid the outcome corresponding to the ball you drew. If you should desire to do so, after the draw you can verify that there are indeed 8 balls with numbers between 1 and 8 inclusive in the urn. If part II should be chosen for real play, you are endowed with 120 Birr. These 120 Birr are yours, but it is possible that you will lose part or all of the money in the experiment (but no more than that).
In part II you are again asked to repeatedly choose between the two types of lotteries you have already encountered in part I of the experiment and a series of sure amounts. However, the main difference now is that the amounts involved are negative instead of positive. Figure 3 shows an example of such a choice. Fig. 3: example of a typical In the example displayed, you face the following lottery: if a ball with the number 1 , 2 , 3, or 4 is extracted, you lose 60 Birr. If a ball with the number 5 , 6 , 7 , or 8 is extracted, you lose nothing. Please choose again for each row whether you would rather give up (i.e., pay) the sure amount indicated to the right or play the lottery.
Notice that, most likely, you will now begin to the right by choosing to give up the sure amounts as long as this implies giving up small amounts, and then switch to the lottery at a certain point. If you do not want to give up sure amounts at all, then in the first row you can choose the lottery and then continue with the lottery for all choices (logic: if you are not willing to pay 3 Birr to avoid playing the lottery, then you should not be willing to pay 6 Birr to avoid it). Once again, when exactly you switch from the sure loss to the lottery depends entirely on your preferences-there are no right or wrong answers. However, you should NOT switch back and forth several times between lottery and sure amount! You will be excluded from the experiment if you do so or if it is not possible to clearly recognize your preference (for example because you have not ticked any box for a given row or ticked both boxes for a row).
In case part II should be chosen for real play, your payoff from part II will be determined in a way analogous to the payoff determination in the first part. First, one of the decision tasks will be chosen at random, and then one of the rows for which you had to indicate a choice. In each case, every choice task or row has an equal probability of being selected. According to your choice, you are will then have to pay the sure amount, or the lottery will be played out by drawing a ball from the indicated urn. 
